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Abstract
The classical Stable Roommates problem asks whether it is possible to have a match-
ing of an even number of agents such that no two agents which are not matched to each
other would prefer to be with each other rather than with their assigned partners. We in-
vestigate Stable Roommates with complete (i.e., every agent can be matched with any
other agent) or incomplete preferences, with ties (i.e., two agents are considered of equal
value to some agent) or without ties. It is known that in general allowing ties makes the
problem NP-complete. We provide algorithms for Stable Roommates that are, compared
to those in the literature, more efficient when the input preferences are complete and have
some structural property, such as being narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing. How-
ever, when the preferences are incomplete and have ties, we show that being single-peaked
and single-crossing does not reduce the computational complexity—Stable Roommates
remains NP-complete.
1 Introduction
Given 2 · n agents, each having preferences with regard to how suitable the other agents are
as potential partners, the Stable Roommates problem asks to find a matching, i.e., a set of
disjoint pairs of the agents, without inducing a blocking pair. A blocking pair consists of two
agents that are not matched to each other but prefer to be with each other rather than with
their assigned partners. A matching without blocking pairs is called a stable matching.
Stable Roommates was introduced by Gale and Shapley [22] in the 1960’s and has been
studied extensively since then [28–30, 43, 44]. While it is quite straightforward to see that stable
matchings may not always exist, it is not trivial to see whether an existing stable matching can
be found in polynomial time, even when the input preference orders are complete and do not
contain ties (i.e., each agent can be a potential partner to each other agent, and no two agents
∗A preliminary verion of this work appeared in the Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Algo-
rithmic Decision Theory (ADT ’17) [8], volume 10576 of LNCS, pages 315–330, Springer, 2017. This full version
contains proof details for Proposition 2.1, Observation 2.2, and Proposition 4.1. Furthermore, the reduction used
for our main result (Theorem 4.4) was replaced by a completely new reduction showing NP-hardness for the case
of narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing preferences (the preferences in the previous reduction were not
narcissistic).
†Most of the work was done while all authors were with TU Berlin, with some additional work done while
Jiehua Chen was with Ben-Gurion University.
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are considered to be equally suitable as a partner). For the case without ties, Irving [28] and
Gusfield and Irving [26] provided O(n2)-time algorithms to decide the existence of a stable
matching and to find one if it exists for complete preferences and for incomplete preferences,
respectively. Deciding whether a given instance admits a stable matching is NP-complete [43]
when the given preferences may have ties.
Solving Stable Roommates has many applications, such as matching students with each
other to accomplish a homework project or users in a P2P file sharing network, assigning co-
workers to two-person offices, partitioning players in two-player games, or finding receiver-donor
pairs for organ transplants [31, 33, 34, 45, 46]. In such situations, the students, the people,
or the players, who we jointly refer to as agents, typically have certain structurally restricted
preferences on which other agents might be their best partners. For instance, when assigning
roommates, each agent may have an ideal room temperature and may prefer to be with another
agent with the same penchant. Such preferences are called narcissistic. Moreover, if we order the
agents according to their ideal room temperatures, then it is natural to assume that each agent
prefers to be with an agent x rather than with another agent y if z’s ideal temperature is closer
to x’s than to y’s. This kind of preferences is called single-peaked [5, 13, 27]. Single-peakedness
is used to model agents’ preferences where there is a criterion, e.g., room temperature, that can
be used to obtain a linear order of the agents such that each agent’s preferences over all agents
along this order are strictly increasing until they reach the peak—their ideal partner—and then
strictly decreasing. Single-peakedness is a popular concept with prominent applications in voting
contexts. It can be tested for in linear time [2, 4, 14, 18] if the input preferences are complete
and have no ties. Another possible restriction on the preferences is the single-crossing property,
which was originally proposed to model individuals’ preferences on income taxation [38, 42].
It requires a linear order (the so-called single-crossing order) of the agents so that for each
two distinct agents x and y, there exists at most one pair of consecutive agents (the crossing
point) along the single-crossing order that disagrees on the relative order of x and y. Single-
crossingness can be detected in polynomial time [6, 14, 15] if the input preferences are complete
and have no ties. We refer to Bredereck et al. [7] and Elkind et al. [17] for numerous references
on single-peakedness and single-crossingness.
Related work. Bartholdi III and Trick [4] studied Stable Roommates with narcissistic and
single-peaked preferences. They showed that for the case with linear orders (i.e., complete and
without ties) Stable Roommates always admits a unique stable matching, and they provided
an O(n)-time algorithm to find this matching. This is remarkable since restricting the preference
domain does not only guarantee the existence of stable matchings, but also allows finding it in
time O(n), that is, sub-linear in the input length O(n2). In this specific case, this speed up
implies that a stable matching can be found without “reading” the whole input preferences
as long as the input is assumed to be narcissistic and single-peaked. In terms of preference
structures in the stable matching setting, using a connection between narcissistic single-crossing
preference profiles and semi-standard Young tableaux [48], Chen and Finnendahl [9] counted the
number of narcissistic preference profiles that are also either single-peaked or single-crossing.
Paper structure and our contributions. In this work, we study the computational com-
plexity of Stable Roommates for structured preferences when incompleteness and ties are
allowed. In particular, we explore how the specific preference structures help in guarantee-
ing the existence of stable matchings and in designing efficient algorithms for finding a stable
matching, even when the input preferences may be incomplete or contain ties.
In Section 2, we discuss natural generalizations of the well-known single-peaked and single-
crossing preferences (that were originally introduced for linear orders) for incomplete preferences
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Table 1: Complexity of Stable Roommates for restricted domains: narcissistic, single-peaked,
and single-crossing preferences. Entries marked with ♦ are from Irving [28]. Entries marked with
♠ are from Gusfield and Irving [26]. Entries marked with △ are from Ronn [43]. Entries marked
with ♥ are from Bartholdi III and Trick [4]. Entries marked boldfaced with a reference to the
corresponding theorem [T. x.y] or proposition [P. x.y] are new results shown in this paper. Note
that our hardness results for single-crossing preferences hold for the more restricted “tie-sensitive
single-crossing” variant.
without ties with ties
complete incomplete complete incomplete
no restriction O(n2)♦ O(n2)♠ NP-c△ NP-c△
narcissistic & single-peaked (s-p) O(n)♥ O(n2)♠ O(n2) [T. 3.3] NP-c [T. 4.4]
narcissistic & single-crossing (s-c) O(n) [P. 3.4] O(n2)♠ O(n2) [P. 3.4] NP-c [T. 4.4]
narcissistic & s-p & s-c O(n)♥ [P. 3.4] O(n2)♠ O(n2) [P. 3.4] NP-c [T. 4.4]
with ties. In Section 3, we show that for complete preference orders, structurally restricted pref-
erences such as being narcissistic and single-crossing or being narcissistic and single-peaked
guarantee the existence of stable matchings. Moreover, we demonstrate that the known algo-
rithm of Bartholdi III and Trick [4] can be extended to always finds a stable matching in two
new cases: The algorithm works when the preferences are complete, narcissistic, single-crossing,
and may contain ties as well as when the preferences are complete, narcissistic, single-peaked,
and may contain ties. The running time for 2 ·n agents increases to O(n2) when ties are present.
In Section 4 we study the case where the preferences are incomplete and may contain ties, and
prove that Stable Roommates becomes NP-complete, even when the preferences are narcis-
sistic, single-peaked, and (tie-sensitive) single-crossing. Our results, together with those from
related work, are surveyed in Table 1. We conclude in Section 5 with some open questions.
2 Fundamental concepts and basic observations
In this section, we introduce fundamental concepts and notions, arising from stable matchings
and structured preferences, and we make some crucial observations regarding relation between
the structured preferences.
2.1 Preferences, acceptable sets, and acceptability graphs
Let V = {1, 2, . . . , 2n} be a set of 2 ·n agents. Each agent i ∈ V has a preference order i which
is a weak order on a subset V (i) ⊆ V of agents that i finds acceptable as a partner. Recall
that a weak order on a set X of elements is a transitive and complete binary relation on X.
The set V (i) is called the acceptable set of i. For each two acceptable agents x, y ∈ V (i),
the expression “x i y” means that i weakly prefers x over y (i.e., i finds that x is better than
or as good as y). We use ≻i to denote the asymmetric part of i (i.e., x i y and ¬(y i x),
meaning that i strictly prefers x to y) and ∼i to denote the symmetric part of ≻i (i.e., x i y
and y i x, meaning that i values x and y equally).
We assume that the acceptability relation between each two agents is symmetric, i.e., for each
two distinct agents i and j it holds that i finds j acceptable if and only if j finds i acceptable,
as otherwise i and j will never be partners of each other. Formally, this means that i ∈ V (≻j) if
and only if j ∈ V (≻i). Moreover, since an agent that is acceptable to no other agents will never
obtain a partner we also assume that for each agent i there is at least another agent j 6= i with
i ∈ V (j).
3
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(a) The underlying acceptability graph
of a Stable Roommates instance with
complete preferences, where any two dis-
tinct agents may find each other accept-
able.
w1 w2 w3 w4
m1 m2 m3 m4
(b) The underlying acceptability graph of a classic Sta-
ble Marriage instance, which is always bipartite. In
such an instance, each woman from the top row can
only be matched with a man from the bottom row, and
the converse.
Figure 1: Acceptability graphs of two special cases of Stable Roommates.
We note that although in Stable Roommates, an agent cannot be matched to itself, it
may still make sense to include an agent x in its own acceptable set, i.e., x ∈ V (x), for instance
when the preferences of x are based on how close or similar agents are to the ideal partner of x
and a partner which is “identical” to x itself is an ideal partner of x. We call an agent x a most
acceptable agent of another agent y if for all z ∈ Vy \ {x, y} it holds that x y z. Note that an
agent can have more than one most acceptable agent.
Let X ⊆ V and Y ⊆ V be two disjoint sets of agents and  be a binary relation over V ×V .
To simplify notation, by X  Y , we mean that for each two agents x and y with x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y it holds that x  y. Analogously, by X ≻ Y and X ∼ Y we mean that for each two
agents x and y with x ∈ X and y ∈ Y it holds that x ≻ y and x ∼ y, respectively. For each
binary relation symbol ⋆ ∈ {,≻,∼}, we use X⋆y and y⋆X as shortcut for X⋆{y} and {y}⋆X,
respectively.
To visualize which agent is considered as acceptable by an agent we introduce the notion
of acceptability graphs. An acceptability graph G for a set V of agents is an undirected graph
without loops, where an edge signifies that two distinct agents find each other acceptable. We
use V to also denote the vertex set of G. Formally, for each agent i ∈ V , there is a vertex i
corresponding to agent i. There is an edge {i, j} in G if i ∈ V (j) \{j} and j ∈ V (i) \{i}. As
already discussed, we assume without loss of generality that G does not contain isolated vertices
as otherwise the corresponding agents will never be able to obtain any partner. We illustrate
two prominent special cases of acceptability graphs in Figure 1.
2.2 Blocking pairs and stable matchings
Given a preference profile P for a set V of agents, a matching M ⊆ E(G) is a subset of disjoint
pairs {x, y} of agents with x 6= y (or edges in E(G)), where E(G) is the set of edges in the
corresponding acceptability graph G. For a pair {x, y} of agents, if {x, y} ∈ M , then let M(x)
denote the corresponding partner y of agent x; otherwise we call {x, y} unmatched. We write
M(x) = ⊥ if agent x has no partner, i.e., if agent x is not involved in any pair in M . An
unmatched pair {x, y} ∈ E(G) \M is blocking M if the pair “prefers” to be matched with each
other rather than staying in their current state, i.e., it holds that
(M(x) = ⊥ ∨ y ≻x M(x)) ∧ (M(y) = ⊥ ∨ x ≻y M(y)).
A matching M is stable if no unmatched pair is blocking M . When the preferences may
contain ties, our stability concept is sometimes referred to as weak stability in the literature
to distinguish from two other popular stability concepts, called strong stability and super sta-
bility [26]. When the preferences do not contain ties, all these three stability concepts are
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equivalent. In this work, we only focus on weak stability. For brevity’s sake, we thus simply use
stability to refer to weak stability.
Example 2.1. Consider the following profile:
agent 1: 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4,
agent 2: 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 4,
agent 3: 3 ≻ 2 ∼ 4 ≻ 1,
agent 4: 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1.
It admits exactly two stable matchings: M1 = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}}, and M2 = {{1, 4}, {2, 3}}; both
are perfect, i.e., each agent is assigned a partner. However, if agent 3 changes its preference
order to 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 4, then the resulting profile does not admit any stable matching: One can
check that for each matching, any agent i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, that is matched to agent 4 will form a
blocking pair together with the agent that is at the third position of the preference order of i.
We investigate the computational complexity of the following stable matching problem.
Stable Roommates
Input: A preference profile P for a set V = {1, 2, . . . , 2 · n} of 2 · n agents.
Question: Does P admit a stable matching?
2.3 Preference profiles and their properties
A preference profile P for V is a collection (i)i∈V of preference orders for each agent i ∈ V . A
profile P may have one ore more of the following three simple properties:
Completeness. Profile P is complete if for each agent i ∈ V it holds that V (i) ∪ {i} = V ;
otherwise it is incomplete.
Ties. Profile P has a tie if there is an agent i ∈ V and there are two distinct agents x, y ∈ V (i)
with x ∼i y. Note that linear orders are exactly those orders that are complete and have
no ties.
Narcissism. Profile P is narcissistic if each agent i strictly prefers itself to every other accept-
able agent, i.e., for each j ∈ V (i) \ {i} it holds that i ≻i j.
The profile given in Example 2.1 are complete and narcissistic, and contains one tie.
We note that having complete preferences means that any two distinct agents can be matched
with each other. Thus, a stable matching must be perfect, i.e., each agent must be assigned a
partner by a stable matching. As for the narcissistic property alone, there is no restriction on or
guarantee for the existence of a stable matching. We will, however, see that for some variants
of restricted preferences (such as single-peaked or single-crossing preferences as formally defined
below) requiring the preferences to be additionally narcissistic make a difference.
As already discussed in Section 1, the single-peaked and the single-crossing properties were
originally introduced and studied mainly for linear preference orders (i.e., preferences without
ties). For preferences with ties, a natural generalization is to think of a possible linear extension
of the preferences for which the single-peaked or single-crossing property holds. We consider
this variant in our paper.
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1: 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4
2: 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 4
3: 3 ≻ 2 ∼ 4 ≻ 1
4: 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1
(a) Visualization of single-peaked preferences.
1: 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4
2: 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 4
3: 3 ≻ 2 ∼ 4 ≻ 1
4: 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1
(b) Visualization of single-crossing preferences.
Figure 2: Illustrating the restricted profile from Example 2.1 which has complete preferences
with ties that are narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing.
Single-peakedness. Profile is single-peaked if there is a linear order ⊲ over V such that the
preference order of each agent i is single-peaked with respect to ⊲:
∀x, y, z ∈ V (i) with x⊲ y ⊲ z it holds that (x ≻i y implies y i z).
We refer to ⊲ as single-peaked order of the profile.
Example 2.2. The profile given in Example 2.1 is single-peaked, as can be shown by Figure 2a.
In fact, as we will see in Section 3, a narcissistic and single-peaked preference profile always
admits a stable matching. Recall that if agent 3 changes its preference order to 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 4,
then the resulting profile does not admit any stable matching and, indeed, it is also not single-
peaked anymore.
(Tie-Sensitive) Single-crossingness. Just as for the single-peakedness property, the single-
crossingness property also requires a natural linear order of the agents, the so-called single-
crossing order. However, unlike the single-peakedness property which assumes that the pref-
erences of an agent i over two agents are compared by their “distance” to the peak along the
single-peaked order, the single-crossingness property assumes that the agents’ preferences over
each two distinct agents change (cross) at most once.
In fact, for preferences with ties, two natural single-crossing notions are of interest. To
describe them, we introduce several notions that together partition a subset of agents according
to their preferences over two distinct agents x and y: Let V [x ≻ y] := {i ∈ V | x ≻i y} be the
subset of agents i that strictly prefer x to y, and let V [x ∼ y] := {i ∈ V | x ∼i y} be the subset
of agents i that find x and y to be of equal value.
First, we say that profile P is single-crossing if there is a linear extension of P to a profile P ′ =
(≻′1, ≻
′
2, . . . ,≻
′
2·n) where for each i ∈ {1, . . . , 2·n} the order ≻
′
i is a linear order on the acceptable
set V (i) with ≻i⊆≻
′
i, and there is a linear order ⊲ on V such that for each two distinct agents x
and y, P ′ is single-crossing with respect to ⊲, i.e.,
V [x ∼′ y] = ∅, and either V [x ≻′ y]⊲ V [y ≻′ x] or V [y ≻′ x]⊲ V [x ≻′ y].
Figure 2b shows that the profile used in Example 2.1 is single-crossing.
Second, we also consider a more restricted concept of single-crossingness which requires that
the agents that have ties towards a pair are ordered in the middle. A profile P is called tie-sen-
sitive single-crossing if there is a linear order ⊲ over V such that each pair {x, y} of two distinct
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1: 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4
2: 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4 ≻ 1
3: 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1 ≻ 4
4: 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1
(a) A Stable Roommates instance with narcis-
sistic and single-peaked preferences. They are not
single-crossing because of the following. To form
a single-crossing order, due to pair {1, 4}, agent 1
must be next to agent 3, and agent 2 must be next
to agent 4. Moreover, due to pair {2, 3}, agent 1
must be next to agent 2, and agent 3 must be next
to agent 4. All these four conditions, however, can-
not be satisfied by a linear order.
1: 1 ∼ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4
2: 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 4 ≻ 3
3: 4 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 1
4: 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1
1: 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4
2: 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 4 ≻ 3
3: 4 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 1
4: 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1
(b) Top: A Stable Roommates instance
with single-crossing preferences, with a single
tie. They are not tie-sensitive single-crossing
since {2, 3, 4} implies that 1 ⊲ 2 ⊲ 3 ⊲ 4 and its
reverse are the only possible single-crossing or-
ders. But, {1, 2} is neither tie-sensitive single-
crossing with respect to ⊲ nor with respect to
its reverse. Bottom: A possible linear extension,
showing single-crossingness.
Figure 3: Visualization of preference profiles with different structural properties.
agents is tie-sensitive single-crossing with respect to ⊲, i.e.,
either V [x ≻ y]⊲ V [x ∼ y]⊲ V [y ≻ x] or V [y ≻ x]⊲ V [x ∼ y]⊲ V [x ≻ y].
See Figure 3 for an illustration of the different types of restricted preferences for the case where
the preferences are linear orders.
2.4 Basic observations for the structural properties of preferences
Incomplete preferences with ties as used in this work are only a special case of partial orders.
There are many slightly different concepts of single-peakedness and single-crossingness for partial
orders [16, 21, 32]. It is known that detecting single-peakedness or single-crossingness is NP-
hard for partial orders under most of the concepts studied in the literature [2, 4, 6, 14, 15, 18].
For partial orders, our two single-crossing concepts are incomparable. In particular, there are
incomplete preferences with ties which are single-crossing but not tie-sensitive single-crossing,
and the converse also holds. For complete preferences with ties which is a restricted case of
partial orders, Elkind et al. [16] showed that tie-sensitive single-crossing preference profiles are
a strict subset of single-crossing preference profiles. In the following, we extend these results by
considering the case when the preferences can be incomplete.
Proposition 2.1. 1. For preferences without ties, tie-sensitive single-crossingness is equiva-
lent to single-crossingness.
2. For preferences with ties, tie-sensitive single-crossingness implies single-crossingness.
3. For preferences with ties, single-crossingness does not always imply tie-sensitive single-
crossingness.
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Proof. The first statement follows from the observation that when a profile does not have any
ties, the definitions of single-crossingness and tie-sensitive single-crossingness coincide.
As for the second statement, let P = (i)i∈V be a profile that is tie-sensitive single-crossing
with respect to some linear order ⊲ on V . We resolve the ties in the preferences given in P
according to an arbitrary order on V and show that this extended profile is a linear extension
of the profile P and is single-crossing with respect to ⊲. To this end, let ◮ be an arbitrary but
fixed linear order on V and let P ′ = (′i)i∈V be a copy of the profile P with 
′
i=i, i ∈ V . For
each agent i ∈ V and for each pair {x, y} ⊆ V (i) of agents acceptable to i such that x ∼i y,
let x ≻′i y if and only if x ◮ y. For each agent i since the preference order i is a weak order
on V (i), it must hold that.
for each acceptable agents x, y of i we have that x ≻′i y implies x i y. (1)
First of all, we claim that P ′ is a linear extension of P. For the sake of contradiction, suppose
that there is a voter i such that ′i is not a linear extension of i. Since i⊆
′
i and since 
′
i
does not include any ties, the assumption that ′i is not a linear extension of i means that
there are three acceptable agents x, y, z ∈ V (i) with
x ≻′i y, y ≻
′
i z, and z ≻
′
i x. (2)
By (1), we infer that x i y, y i z, and z i x. By the transitivity of i, these three relations
imply that x ∼i y, y ∼i z, and z ∼i x. This means that the pairwise relative orders of x, y, z in
′i are resolved according to the order ◮, that is, x ◮ y, y ◮ z, and z ◮ x—a contradiction to
◮ being transitive.
It remains to show that P ′ = (′i)i∈V is single-crossing with respect to ⊲. Suppose towards
a contradiction that P ′ is not single-crossing with respect to ⊲, and suppose that there are three
agents i, j, k in the order i⊲j⊲k and there are two acceptable agents x, y ∈ V (′i)∩V (
′
j)∩V (
′
k)
such that x ≻′i y, y ≻
′
j x, and x ≻
′
k y. By (1), we infer that
x i y, y j x, and x k y. (3)
We distinguish between two cases for x j y, in each case aiming at reaching a contradiction.
If x ∼j y, then by (2) it follows that y ◮ x and that ¬(y ∼i x) and ¬(y ∼k x). Thus, by
(3), it follows that x ≻i y and x ≻k y—a contradiction to ⊲ being a tie-sensitive single-crossing
order for P.
If y ≻j x, then since ⊲ is a tie-sensitive single-crossing order for P and by (3) it follows
that ¬(x ≻i y) or ¬(x ≻k y). This implies that x ∼i y or x ∼k y. If x ∼i y, then y ≻k x–a
contradiction to (3). If x ∼k y, then y ≻k x–again a contradiction to (3).
Figure 3b demonstrates that for preferences with ties, the converse of the second statement
in Proposition 2.1 does not hold, showing the third statement.
For incomplete preferences with ties, Lackner [32] showed that detecting single-peakedness is
NP-complete. For complete preferences with ties, while Elkind et al. [16] showed that detecting
single-crossingness is NP-complete, Fitzsimmons [20] and Elkind et al. [16] provided polynomial-
time algorithms for detecting single-peakedness and ties-sensitive single-crossingness. All these
known hardness results seem to hold only when the preferences have ties. However, we observe
that the hardness reduction for Corollary 6 by Elkind et al. [16] indeed can be adapted to show
NP-completeness for deciding whether an incomplete preference profile without ties is single-
peaked (resp. single-crossing). The crucial differences are that they allow ties and that the agents
and the alternatives are different while we do not allow ties and our agent set is the same as the
set of alternatives. For the sake of completeness, we show this adapted proof.
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Observation 2.2. Deciding whether an incomplete preference profile without ties is single-
crossing (or equivalently tie-sensitive single-crossing) or single-peaked is NP-complete.
Proof. As Elkind et al. [16], we reduce from the NP-hard Betweenness problem [41]:
Betweenness
Input: Given a universe U = {u1, . . . , un} and a set T = {t1, . . . , tm} of ordered
triples over U .
Question: Is there a betweenness order ◮, that is, a total linear order over U such
that for each triple (x, y, z) from T it holds that either x ◮ y ◮ z or z ◮ y ◮ x?
The reduction for the single-peaked case is quite simple while the reduction for the single-crossing
case is similar to the one used by Elkind et al. [16, Corollary 6].
The single-peaked case. Given an instance I = (U, T ) of Betweenness, where U =
{u1, . . . , un} and T = {t1, . . . , um}, we construct a preference profile P = (≻x)x∈V for an
agent set V , whose preferences contain no ties but may be incomplete; without loss of generality
we assume that the elements in each ordered triple (x, y, z) ∈ T are pairwise distinct. The agent
set V has two types of agents, which sum up to n + 2m agents. First, for each element ui
add to V an element agent with the same name. Second, for each triple tj = (x, y, z) from T
(with x, y, z ∈ U) add to V two agents aj and a
′
j .
The preferences of the agents are constructed as follows: Each agent ui ∈ U only finds those
agents acceptable that “contain” the corresponding element, and has a linear order on these
acceptable agents that are consistent with the following order
L := a1 ≻ · · · ≻ am ≻ a
′
1 ≻ · · · ≻ a
′
m.
Formally, the preferences of agent ui are
≻ui : [A(ui)] ≻ [A
′[ui]],
where A(ui) = {aj | ui ∈ tj} (resp. A′(ui) = {a′j | ui ∈ tj}) and [A(ui)] ≻ [A
′(ui)] is a linear
order on A(ui)∪A
′(ui)) that respects L. For each triple tj = (x, y, z) ∈ T , the preferences of aj
and a′j are
≻aj : y ≻ x ≻ z and ≻a′j : y ≻ z ≻ x.
We show that P is single-peaked if and only if the given instance is a yes-instance. On the
one hand, every betweenness order ◮ for I = (U, T ) can be extended to a single-peaked order
for the constructed profile by appending to ◮ the order ◮ a1 ◮ · · · am ◮ a
′
1 ◮ · · · ◮ a
′
m. On the
other hand, note that the preferences of the agents of the second type require a single-peaked
order to place element y in between x and z. Thus, a single-peaked order ⊲ for P restricted
to U is always a betweenness order for (U, T ).
The single-crossing case. Given an instance I = (U, T ) of Betweenness, where U =
{u1, . . . , un} and T = {t1, . . . , tm}, we construct a preference profile P = (≻x)x∈V for an agent
set V , whose preferences contain no ties but may be incomplete; without loss of generality we
assume that the elements in each ordered triple (x, y, z) ∈ T are pairwise distinct.
The agent set V has two types of agents, which sum up to n + 3m agents. First, for each
element ui add to V an element agent with the same name. Second, for each triple tj = (x, y, z)
from T (with x, y, z ∈ U) add to V three agents aj, bj , cj . Before we describe the preferences,
let us describe the acceptability graph: For each triple tj = (x, y, z) from T (with x, y, z ∈ U)
we have
V (≻aj ) = V (≻bj ) = V (≻cj) = {x, y, z}.
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Symmetrically, for each element agent u ∈ U , we have V (ui) = {aj , bj , cj | u ∈ tj}. For ease of
notation, for each triple tj ∈ T , let Tj := {aj , bj, cj}.
For each triple tj = (x, y, z) from T , the agents aj , bj , and cj have the same linear order on
{x, y, z}, which is ascending on the indices of x, y, z in U . For each element agent u ∈ U , its
preferences on V (≻u) are as follows: First of all, for each two triples tj and tj′ that contain the
element u, we have
≻u : Tj ≻ Tj′ .
The specific order on the triple agents in Tj (resp. Tj′) depends on the position of u in the
triple tj. To this end, let
Lxj := aj ≻ bj ≻ cj ,
Lyj := bj ≻ aj ≻ cj ,
Lzj := cj ≻ bj ≻ aj .
To make the preferences of u a linear order, for each triple tj = (x, y, z) ∈ T that contains the
element u, let the element agent u have preferences that obey the order Lkj if and only if u = k.
We show that P is single-crossing if and only if the given instance is a yes-instance. On the
one hand, a single-crossing order ⊲ for the constructed profile restricted to U is a betweenness
order for (U, T ): For every triple triple tj = (x, y, z) from T the preferences of x, y, and z
restricted to Tj imply that either x ⊲ y ⊲ z or z ⊲ y ⊲ x. On the other hand, a betweenness
order ◮ for (U,S) can be extended to a single-crossing order for the constructed profile by
appending the order ◮ a1 ◮ b1 ◮ c1 ◮ · · · am ◮ bm ◮ cm to its end.
Saporiti and Tohmé [47] showed that for complete preferences without ties, narcissistic and
single-crossing preferences are also single-peaked. We strengthen this result by showing that
the relation also holds when ties are allowed. We note that although Barberà and Moreno [3]
also considered complete preferences with ties, their single-crossingness for the case with ties
only resembles our tie-sensitive single-crossing definition, which is a strict subset of the single-
crossingness defined in Section 2.3 (see Proposition 2.1).
Proposition 2.3. If a complete, even with ties, and narcissistic preference profile P has a
single-crossing order ⊲, then this order ⊲ is also a single-peaked order.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that ⊲ with a1⊲a2⊲ · · ·⊲a2·n is not single-peaked.
This means that there exists an agent ai that is not single-peaked with respect to ⊲, and there
are three agents aj, ak, aℓ with j < k < ℓ such that aj ≻ai ak and aℓ ≻ai ak. Together with the
property of being narcissistic, the following holds:
agent ai : ai ≻ai aj ≻ai ak and ai ≻ai aℓ ≻ai ak, agent aj : aj ≻aj ak,
agent ak : ak ≻ak aj and ak ≻ak aℓ, agent aℓ : aℓ ≻aℓ ak.
On the one hand, the agents’ preferences over the pair {aj , ak} implies that i < k. On the other
hand, the pair {ak, aℓ} implies that i > k—a contradiction.
The profile shown in Figure 2 is narcissistic and single-crossing with respect to the order
1⊲ 2⊲ 3⊲ 4 and it is also single-peaked with respect to the same order ⊲.
There is no direct relation between single-peakedness and single-crossingness, even if the
profile is complete and do note contain ties [7].
Proposition 2.4. [7, Figure 1] Even for complete preference profiles without ties, single-peakedness
does not imply single-crossingness. Neither does single-crossingness imply single-peakedness.
10
3 Complete preferences
In this section, we analyze the computational complexity of Stable Roommates for the case
when the input preference profiles have complete and structured preferences. In particular,
we show that the in general NP-hard Stable Roommates problem with ties allowed becomes
polynomial-time solvable when the preferences are narcissistic and either single-crossing or single-
peaked.
For the case of complete, narcissistic, and single-peaked preferences without ties, Bartholdi III
and Trick [4] showed that Stable Roommates is even solvable in O(n) time. Their algorithm
is based on the following two facts (referred to as Propositions 3.1 and 3.2) that are related to
the concept of most acceptable agents. We show that the facts transfer to the case with ties.
Proposition 3.1. If the given preference profile P is complete (even with ties), narcissistic, and
single-peaked, then there are two distinct agents i, j that are each other’s most acceptable agents.
Proof. The statement for complete, narcissistic, and single-peaked preferences without ties was
shown by Bartholdi III and Trick [4]. It turns out that this also holds for the case when ties are
allowed. Let V be the set of all 2 ·n agents and consider a single-peaked order ⊲ of the agents V
with x1 ⊲ x2 ⊲ · · · ⊲ xn. For each agent x ∈ V , let Mx be the set of all most acceptable agents
of x. Towards a contradiction, suppose that each two distinct agents x and y have x /∈ My or
y /∈Mx. By the narcissistic property and single-peakedness, each Mx ∪ {x} forms an interval in
⊲. This implies that the first agent x1 and the last agent xn in the order ⊲ have x2 ∈Mx1 and
xn−1 ∈Mxn . By our assumption (x /∈My or y /∈Mx), however, x2 ∈Mx1 implies that for each
i ∈ {2, . . . , n} the following holds: xi−1 /∈Mx—a contradiction to xn−1 ∈Mxn .
By the stability definition, we have the following for complete preferences.
Proposition 3.2. Let P be a preference profile with complete preferences and let M be a stable
matching for P. Let P ′ be a preference profile resulting from P by adding two agents x, y
who consider each other as most acceptable (and their preferences over other agents and the
preferences of other agents over x, y are arbitrary but fixed, respectively). Then, matching M ∪
{{x, y}} is stable for P ′.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that M ∪ {{x, y}} is not stable for P ′. This means
that P ′ has a blocking pair {u,w} /∈ M . Obviously, |{u,w} ∩ {x, y}| = 1 as otherwise {u,w}
would also be a blocking pair for P. Assume without loss of generality that u = x. Then, by
the definition of blocking pairs, it must hold that w ≻x y—a contradiction to y being one of the
most acceptable agents of x.
Utilizing restricted versions of Propositions 3.1 and 3.2, Bartholdi III and Trick [4] derived a
greedy algorithm to construct a unique stable matching when the preferences are linear orders
(i.e., complete and without ties) and are narcissistic and single-peaked (see Algorithm 1). For
2 · n agents their algorithm runs in O(n) time. We will show that Algorithm 1 also works when
ties are allowed. The stable matching, however, may not be unique anymore and the running
time is O(n2) since we need to update the preferences of each agent after we match one pair of
two agents.
Theorem 3.3. A preference profile with 2 ·n agents that is complete, with ties, narcissistic and
single-peaked always admits a stable matching, which can be found by Algorithm 1 in O(n2) time.
Proof. To show that such a profile P always admits a stable matching, we show that on input P
Algorithm 1 always returns a matching of P which is stable. Indeed, the latter follows directly
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Algorithm 1: The algorithm of Bartholdi III and Trick [4] for computing a stable matching
with input P being complete, narcissistic, and single-peaked.
M ← ∅;
while P 6= ∅ do
Find two agents x, y in P that consider each other as most acceptable;
Delete x and y from profile P ;
M ←M ∪ {x, y};
return M ;
from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 and the narcissistic and single-peaked property is preserved after
deleting any agent. As for the running time, there are n rounds to build up M , and in each
round we find two distinct agents x and y whose most acceptable agent sets Mx and My include
each other: x ∈My and y ∈ Mx. Note that Proposition 3.1 implies that two such agents exist.
After each round we need to update the most acceptable agents of at most 2 · n agents. Thus,
in total the running time is O(n2).
Now, we move on to (tie-sensitive) single-crossingness.
Proposition 3.4. A preference profile with 2 · n agents that is complete, with ties, narcissistic
and single-crossing (or tie-sensitive single-crossing) always admits a stable matching, which can
be found by Algorithm 1 in O(n2) time. The running time for the case without ties is O(n).
Proof. By Proposition 2.3 and Proposition 2.1 (i), the stated profiles are single-peaked. For the
case with ties, by Theorem 3.3, we obtain the desired statement. For the case without ties, we
obtain the corresponding O(n) running time by additionally using the result of Bartholdi III
and Trick [4, Section 3].
4 Incomplete preferences
In this section, we consider the case when the input preferences may be incomplete, meaning that
the underlying acceptability graph may not be a complete graph. One reason for the occurrence
of incomplete preferences could be that two agents may consider each other unacceptable and do
not want to be matched together, or they are not “allowed” to be matched to each other. If in this
case no two agents are considered of equal value by any agent (i.e., the preferences do not have
ties), then Stable Roommates still remains polynomial-time solvable [26]. However, once ties
are involved, Stable Roommates becomes NP-complete [43] even for complete preferences.
First of all, we observe that once ties are allowed, neither single-peakedness nor single-
crossingness, combined with narcissism, can guarantee that there are always two agents that are
each other’s most acceptable agent. However, having such two agents is crucial for the existence
of a stable matching so that the algorithm by Bartholdi III and Trick [4] can work in time linear
in the number of agents. Moreover, for incomplete preferences, even without ties, narcissistic
and single-crossing preferences do not imply single-peakedness anymore.
Proposition 4.1. For incomplete preferences without ties, the following holds.
1. Narcissistic and single-crossing preferences are not necessarily single-peaked.
2. Narcissistic and single-peaked (resp. single-crossing) preferences guarantee neither the unique-
ness nor the existence of stable matchings.
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Proof. To show the first statement, consider the following profile with six agents 1, 2, . . . , 6:
Profile P1 : agent 1: 1 ≻1 6 ≻1 5, agent 2: 2 ≻2 5 ≻2 6,
agent 3: 3 ≻3 5 ≻3 6, agent 4: 4 ≻4 5 ≻4 6,
agent 5: 5 ≻5 1 ≻5 2 ≻5 3 ≻5 4, agent 6: 6 ≻6 4 ≻6 2 ≻6 3 ≻6 1.
One can check that the profile is narcissistic, and it is single-crossing with respect to the order 1⊲
2 ⊲ · · · ⊲ 6, but it is not single-peaked because of the last two agents’ preference orders over
1, 2, 3, 4. In fact, the profile is not single-peaked at all since the preference orders of agents 5
and 6 form a forbidden subprofile for the single-peaked property [2]: In a single-peaked order
the agents 2 and 3 must be ordered between the agents 1 and 4 but agent 5’s preferences forbid
to put agent 3 next to 1 whereas agent 6’s preferences forbid to put agent 2 next to agent 1.
The profile does not admit a perfect stable matching, i.e., a stable matching of size three. But,
it admits two stable matchings of size two each: {{1, 5}, {4, 6}} and {{1, 6}, {4, 5}}.
To show the first part of the second statement, consider the following profile with four
agents 1, 2, 3, 4. Once can check that the profile is narcissistic and single-peaked with respect to
the order 1⊲ 2⊲ 3⊲ 4, and single-crossing with respect to the order 1⊲′ 3⊲′ 2⊲′ 4. It admits
two different stable matchings {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}.
Profile P2 : Agent 1: 1 ≻ 2 ≻ 3 ≻ 4, Agent 2: 2 ≻ 4 ≻ 1,
Agent 3: 3 ≻ 1 ≻ 4, Agent 4: 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 1.
To show the second part of the second statement, consider the following profile with six
agents 1, 2, . . . , 6. It is narcissistic, and single-peaked and single-crossing with respect to the
order 3⊲ 2⊲ 1⊲ 4⊲ 5⊲ 6.
Profile P3 : Agent 1: 1 ≻ 5 ≻ 2, Agent 2: 2 ≻ 1 ≻ 3,
Agent 3: 3 ≻ 2 ≻ 4, Agent 4: 4 ≻ 3 ≻ 5,
Agent 5: 5 ≻ 4 ≻ 1 ≻ 6, Agent 6: 6 ≻ 5.
One can check that the profile is single-peaked with respect to the order ⊲. For single-
crossingness, observe that each pair of agents is ranked by at most two different agents so
that the profile is (tie-sensitive) single-crossing with respect to any ordering.
However, no matching M is stable for this profile. To see this, notice that the preferences of
agents from A∗ := {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} form a certain cyclic structure: For each agent i ∈ A∗ it holds
that agent i is the most preferred agent of agent (i mod 5) + 1. Now, consider an arbitrary
matching M . Since |A∗| is odd, there is at least one agent i ∈ A∗ with M(i) /∈ A∗. It is
straightforward to see that i and (i mod 5) + 1 will form a blocking pair for M .
For the case when ties in the preferences are allowed, Ronn [43] showed that Stable Room-
mates becomes NP-hard even if the preferences are complete. The constructed instances in his
hardness proof, however, are not always single-peaked or single-crossing. It is even not clear
whether the problem remains NP-hard for this restricted case. If the preferences need not be
complete, then we show NP-hardness, by a completely different reduction, obtaining our main
result.
Before we state the corresponding theorem, we prove the following two lemmas which are
used heavily in our preference profile construction to force two agents of specific types to be
matched together. The first lemma summarizes an observation on a profile that is similar to the
third profile P3 presented in the proof of Proposition 4.1.
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Lemma 4.2. Let A = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} be a set of 5 distinct agents and let X be a non-empty
set of agents disjoint from A. The preferences of the agents in A satisfy the following, where
(X) means that the agents in set X are tied with each other.
Agent a1 : a1 ≻ a5 ≻ a2, Agent a2 : a2 ≻ a1 ≻ a3,
Agent a3 : a3 ≻ a2 ≻ a4, Agent a4 : a4 ≻ a3 ≻ a5, Agent a5 : a5 ≻ (X) ≻ a4 ≻ a1.
Then, the following holds.
(1) Every stable matching M for A satisfies M(a5) ∈ X, M(a1) = a2, and M(a3) = a4.
(2) The preferences from A are narcissistic and single-peaked with respect to the linear order a3⊲
a2 ⊲ a1 ⊲ a4 ⊲ a5 ⊲ [X], where [X] denotes some fixed linear order of the agents in X.
(3) The preferences are also (tie-sensitive) single-crossing with respect to any ordering of the
agents in A.
Proof. Towards a contradiction to (1), suppose that there is a stable matching M with M(a5) /∈
X. Then, by the preferences of a5, there remain three possibilities (i)–(iii) for the partner of a5.
We claim to obtain a blocking pair for M for each of these possibilities.
Case (i): M(a5) /∈ {a1, a4}. This implies that agent a5 does not have a partner. Then, by
construction, {a5, a1} will be blocking M .
Case (ii): M(a5) = a4. Since a4 prefers a3 to a5, it follows that a3 must obtain a partner that
it prefers to a4 as otherwise {a3, a4} will form a blocking pair for M . Since a2 is the only
(acceptable) agent that a3 prefers to a4, it follows that {a3, a2} ∈ M . Consequently, a1
will not be assigned a partner by M . However, {a1, a2} will form a blocking pair for M .
Case (iii): M(a5) = a1. Analogously to Case (ii), ifM(a5) = a1, then we deduce thatM(a4) =
a3. This implies that a2 remains unmatched by M . However, {a2, a3} will form a blocking
pair for M .
It is straightforward to verify the second statement concerning the single-peaked property. As
for the tie-sensitive single-crossingness, it holds with respect to every order of the agents: Each
pair of agents is ranked by at most two different agents and ties only occur in the preferences
of a5.
Whereas Lemma 4.2 enforces that a specific agent (i.e., a5) must be matched with some
agent from a specific group of agents (i.e., X), the forthcoming lemma enforces some specific
combination of matchings inside X. This seems crucial to ensure the narcissistic, single-peaked,
and tie-sensitive single-crossing property.
Lemma 4.3. Let X := {x1, x2, . . . , x10}, R := {r2, r4, r6, r8} be two disjoint sets of agents, and
let A and B be two other disjoint sets of agents. Furthermore, assume that the preferences of
the agents from X satisfy the following, where the symbols [A] and [B] denote some fixed linear
orders of the agents in A and B, respectively.
Agent x1 : x1 ≻ x10 ≻ [A] ≻ x2, Agent x2 : x2 ≻ x1 ≻ r2 ≻ x3.
Agent x3 : x3 ≻ x2 ≻ x4, Agent x4 : x4 ≻ x3 ≻ r4 ≻ x5.
Agent x5 : x5 ≻ x4 ≻ x6. Agent x6 : x6 ≻ x5 ≻ r6 ≻ x7.
Agent x7 : x7 ≻ x6 ≻ x8. Agent x8 : x8 ≻ x7 ≻ r8 ≻ x9.
Agent x9 : x9 ≻ x8 ≻ x10. Agent x10 : x10 ≻ x9 ≻ [B] ≻ x1.
The following holds for the preferences of X.
1. If M is a stable matching with M(x10) ∈ B, then for each i ∈ {4, 3, 2, 1} we have that
{x2i+1, x2i} ∈M .
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Figure 4: Illustration of the acceptability graphs for Lemmas 4.2 and 4.3. Left: The node labeled
with X represents the agents in X. Thick red lines correspond to a possible stable matching.
Right: The nodes labeled with A and B represent the agents in A and B, respectively. There
are two possible stable matchings, one represented by thick red lines and the other by double
lines.
2. The above preferences are narcissistic as well as single-peaked and tie-sensitive single-
crossing with respect to the following order, where
←−
[A] and
←−
[B] denote the reverse of the
fixed orders [A] and [B], respectively:
←−
[A] ≻
←−
[B] ≻ x10 ⊲ x9 ⊲ x1 ⊲ x2 ⊲ r2 ⊲ x3 ⊲ x4 ⊲ r4 ⊲ x5 ⊲ x6 ⊲ r6 ⊲ x7 ⊲ x8 ⊲ r8.
Proof. By our assumption that M(x10) ∈ B and by the preference order of x10, it follows that
M(x9) = x8 as otherwise {x9, x10} will form a blocking pair for M . By an analogous reasoning
for x7, x5, and x3, we deduce that M(x7) = x6, M(x5) = x4, and M(x3) = x2, showing the first
statement.
As for the second statement, clearly, the preferences of the agents in X, are narcissistic. One
can check that the preferences are indeed single-peaked with respect to the order ⊲. Since no
two agents are ranked by more than two different agents, it is clear that the preferences are
tie-sensitive single-crossing, implying single-crossingness due to Proposition 2.1.
We observe that the acceptability graph for the agents in Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3 display
a certain cyclic structure if we make the edges directed: If we replace each edge {u,w} with
the arc (u,w) if u considers w its most preferred (matchable) agent and delete the remaining
edges, then we obtain a directed cycle. Moreover, we have already seen from P3 in the proof of
Proposition 4.1 that odd cycles imply non-existence of stable matchings. Using this observation,
we can show our main result now.
Theorem 4.4. Stable Roommates for incomplete preferences with ties remains NP-complete,
even if the preferences are narcissistic, single-peaked, and (tie-sensitive) single-crossing.
Proof. First, the problem is in NP since one can non-deterministically guess a matching and
check the stability in polynomial time. To show NP-hardness, we reduce from the NP-complete
Independent Set problem [24], which, given an undirected graph G = (U,E) and a non-
negative integer k, asks whether there is a size-k independent set, i.e., a subset U ′ ⊆ U of
k pairwisely non-adjacent vertices. We assume that each vertex has degree at most three since
Independent Set remains NP-hard for this case [23]. Let (G = (U,E), k) be an Independent
Set instance with U being the vertex set and E being the edge set. Let U := {u1, u2, . . . , un}.
We will construct a Stable Roommates instance P with agent set V which is narcissistic,
single-peaked, and tie-sensitive single-crossing, and show that G admits a size-k independent set
if and only if P admits a stable matching.
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Main idea and the constructed agents. For each vertex ui ∈ U , we introduce 10 vertex
agents uji , 1 ≤ j ≤ 10, denoted as Ui = {u
j
i | 1 ≤ j ≤ 10}. The idea is to obtain an acceptability
graph that has a cycle of length ten (see our discussion just prior to the theorem) for each
vertex of the input graph, including eight for the neighbors of this vertex. This is used to
ensure narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing property simultaneously. Additionally, we
introduce two groups of selector agents, each with k sets:
Group (1): Aj = {a
i
j | 1 ≤ i ≤ 5}, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and
Group (2): Bj = {b
i
j | 1 ≤ i ≤ 5}, 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
We will construct preferences for these selector agents to enforce that each two selectors a5j
and b5j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, are matched to two vertex agents. Together with the preferences of the
vertex agents, we make sure that the vertex agents that are matched to a5j and b
5
j , respectively,
correspond to the same vertex.
The agent set V is defined as V =
(⋃
1≤i≤n Ui
)
∪
(⋃
1≤j≤k(Aj ∪Bj)
)
. In total, we have
constructed 10n+ 10k agents.
To encode an Independent Set instance, we aim to construct preferences for the vertex
agents such that no two vertex agents that are matched to some selector agents correspond to
two adjacent vertices. This property will be formally captured later by Claim 1.
Selector agents. The preferences of the selector agents are of the form as described in
Lemma 4.2. To this end, let U1 = {u1i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and U
10 = {u10i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. We
use (U1) and (U10) to express that the agents in the respective subsets are tied.
∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} :
selector agent a1j : a
1
j ≻ a
5
j ≻ a
2
j , selector agent b
1
j : b
1
j ≻ b
5
j ≻ b
2
j ,
selector agent a2j : a
2
j ≻ a
1
j ≻ a
3
j , selector agent b
2
j : b
2
j ≻ b
1
j ≻ b
3
j ,
selector agent a3j : a
3
j ≻ a
2
j ≻ a
4
j , selector agent b
3
j : b
3
j ≻ b
2
j ≻ b
4
j ,
selector agent a4j : a
4
j ≻ a
3
j ≻ a
5
j , selector agent b
4
j : b
4
j ≻ b
3
j ≻ b
5
j ,
selector agent a5j : a
5
j ≻ (U
1) ≻ a4j ≻ a
1
j . selector agent b
5
j : b
5
j ≻ (U
10) ≻ b4j ≻ b
1
j .
Vertex agents. The preferences of the vertex agents for each vertex ui are of the form de-
scribed in Lemma 4.3.
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} :
vertex agent u1i : u
1
i ≻ u
10
i ≻ [A
5] ≻ u2i , vertex agent u
2
i : u
2
i ≻ u
1
i ≻ r
2
i ≻ u
3
i ,
vertex agent u3i : u
3
i ≻ u
2
i ≻ u
4
i , vertex agent u
4
i : u
4
i ≻ u
3
i ≻ r
4
i ≻ u
5
i ,
vertex agent u5i : u
5
i ≻ u
4
i ≻ u
6
i , vertex agent u
6
i : u
6
i ≻ u
5
i ≻ r
6
i ≻ u
7
i ,
vertex agent u7i : u
7
i ≻ u
6
i ≻ u
8
i , vertex agent u
8
i : u
8
i ≻ u
7
i ≻ r
8
i ≻ u
9
i ,
vertex agent u9i : u
9
i ≻ u
8
i ≻ u
10
i , vertex agent u
10
i : u
10
i ≻ u
9
i ≻ [B
5] ≻ u1i .
Herein, A5 represents the following set A5 := {a5j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k} and [A
5] denotes the following
fixed order of the selector agents in A5: [A5] := a51 ≻ a
5
2 ≻ · · · ≻ a
5
k. The symbols B
5 and [B5]
are defined in an analogous way: B5 := {b5j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k} and [B
5] denotes the following fixed
order of the selector agents in B5: [B5] := b51 ≻ b
5
2 ≻ · · · ≻ b
5
k.
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It remains to specify the agents r2i , r
4
i , r
6
i , and r
8
i . Recall that the maximum vertex degree of
our input graph G is three. By Vizing’s Theorem [49], graph G is 4-edge-colorable, that is, the
edge set of G can be partitioned into four subsets E1, E2, E3, and E4 which are each a matching.
Moreover, this partition can be computed in polynomial time [39]. Thus, we first compute the
sets Ec, 1 ≤ c ≤ 4. Next, for each 1 ≤ c ≤ 4, if Ec contains an edge e = {ui, uj}, then we define
r2ci := u
2c
j (resp. r
2c
j := u
2c
i ). If some vertex ui is not incident to an edge of color c, then r
2c
i is
omitted, that is, agent u2ci has just the ranking u
2c
i ≻ u
2c−1
i ≻ u
2c+1
i .
For an illustration, assume that e1 ∈ E1 and e4 ∈ E2 with e1 = {u1, u2} and e4 = {u1, u3}.
Then, r21, r
2
2, r
4
1 , r
4
3 are of the form r
2
1 = u
2
2, r
2
2 = u
2
1, r
4
1 = u
4
3, r
4
3 = u
4
1.
This completes the construction, which can clearly be performed in polynomial time. Next,
we show that our constructed profile is narcissistic, single-peaked, single-crossing, and tie-sensi-
tive single-crossing.
Single-peakedness. The constructed profile is single-peaked with respect to the following
linear order ⊲:
[Ak]⊲ [Ak−1]⊲ · · ·⊲ [A1]⊲ [Bk]⊲ [Bk−1]⊲ · · ·⊲ [B1]⊲ [U
10,9]⊲ [U1,2]⊲ [U3,4]⊲ [U5,6]⊲ [U7,8].
We specify the notations used in the above order.
– For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and for each (Q, q) ∈ {(A, a), (B, b)}, the let [Qj] denote the
order q3j ⊲ q
2
j ⊲ q
1
j ⊲ q
4
j ⊲ q
5
j (cf. Lemma 4.2).
– The symbol U10,9 denotes the order u101 ⊲ u
10
2 ⊲ · · ·⊲ u
10
n ⊲ u
9
1 ⊲ u
9
2 ⊲ · · ·⊲ u
9
n.
– For each c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} the symbol U2c−1,2c denotes the subset {u2c−1i , u
2c
i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Intuitively, the symbol [U2c−1,2c] denotes an order of the agents in U2c−1,2c, which makes sure
that the preferences of vertex agents that are “incident” to the edges in Ec are single-peaked
with respect to this order. To define [U2c−1,2c], we need the following additional notion: For
each edge e ∈ Ec let ui and uj be the respective endpoints with i < j. Then, let [e] denote
the order u2c−1i ⊲ u
2c
i ⊲ u
2c−1
j ⊲ u
2c
j .
The order [U2c−1,2c] is defined as follows:
[U2c−1,2c] := [ec,1]⊲ [ec,2]⊲ · · ·⊲ [ec,ℓ]⊲ [R],
where ec,1, ec,2, . . . , ec,ℓ is an arbitrary but fixed order of the edges in Ec, and R denotes a
fixed order of the vertex agents ui of the form u
2c−1
i ≻ u
2c
i that are not “incident” to any edge
in Ec.
For an illustration, assume that E1 = {e1, e2} with e1 = {u1, u2} and e2 = {u5, u6}. Then,
[U1,2] could be of the form u11 ⊲ u
2
1 ⊲ u
1
2 ⊲ u
2
2 ⊲ u
1
5 ⊲ u
2
5 ⊲ u
1
6 ⊲ u
2
6 ⊲ u
1
3 ⊲ u
2
3 ⊲ u
1
4 ⊲ u
2
4.
Tie-single-crossingness and single-crossingness. To show that the constructed preference
profile is also tie-sensitive single-crossing we consider each pair p of agents and let Ac(p) denote
the agents which consider both agents in p as acceptable partners. We show that either all
agents in Ac(p) have the same order on p or if two agents exist that order p differently, then
|Ac(p)| = 2. It is straight-forward to verify that if we can show the above statement, then the
profile is tie-sensitive single-crossing, and it is single-crossing by breaking ties in an arbitrary
but fixed way.
To this end, let A5 = {a5j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, B
5 = {b5j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, U
1 = {u1i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, and
U10 = {u10i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
Case 1: p = {azj , a
z′
j } ⊆ Aj (resp. p = {b
z
j , b
z′
j } ⊆ Bj) for some value j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} and
some values z, z′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. This implies that Ac(p) ⊆ Aj (resp. A(p) ⊆ Bj). More-
over, no agent in Ac(p) considers the agents in p to be tied with each other. If there
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are two agents in Ac(p) that order this pair differently, then these agents must be those
from p. It is straightforward to verify that in this case, it holds that p = Ac(p), implying
that |Ac(p)| = 2. For instance, if p = {a1i , a
5}, then Ac(p) = p. Otherwise, |A(p)| = 1. For
instance, if p = {a2i , a
5
i }, then Ac(p) = {a
1
i }.
Case 2: p = {azj , a
z′
j′} (resp. p = {b
z
j , b
z′
j′}) for two distinct values j, j
′ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k} with
j 6= j′ and for some values z, z′ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. If z = z′ = 5, then Ac(p) = U1 (resp.
Ac(p) = U10); otherwise Ac(p) = ∅. For the first case, all agents in Ac(p) have the same
order on p.
Case 3: p = {uji , u
j′
i } ⊆ Ui for some value i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and some distinct values j, j
′ ∈
{1, 2, . . . , 10}. This implies that Ac(p) ⊆ Ui, and no agent in Ac(p) considers the agents
in p to be tied with each other. Analogously, we deduce that if there are two agents in
Ac(p) that order this pair differently, then they must be the agents in p themselves. It is
straightforward to verify that in this case we have p = Ac(p). Otherwise, |Ac(p)| = 1.
Case 4: p = {uji , u
j′
i′} for two distinct values i, i
′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} with i 6= i′ and some two
(possibly identical) values j, j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. If j = j′ ∈ {1, 10}, then either Ac(p) = A5
or Ac(p) = B5. In both cases, all agents in Ac(p) consider the agents in p to be tied
with each other. Otherwise, if the corresponding two vertices vi and vi′ are adjacent with
{vi, vi′} ∈ Ec for some color c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} such that j = j
′ = 2c, then Ac(p) = p. In the
remaining cases for j and j′, no agent considers uji and u
j′
i′ both acceptable as partners
and thus, we deduce that Ac(p) = ∅.
Case 5: p = {uzi , a
z′
j } (resp. p = {u
z
i , b
z′
j }) for some values i, j, z, z
′ with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}, and z′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5}. If z = 1 (resp. z = 10) and
z′ = 5, then by the constructed preferences we deduce that Ac(p) = p.
If z = 1 (resp. z = 10) and z′ ∈ {1, 4}, then by the constructed preferences we deduce that
Ac(p) = {a5j} (resp. Ac(p) = {b
5
j}).
If z ∈ {2, 10} (resp. z ∈ {1, 9}) and z′ = 5, then we deduce that Ac(p) = {u1i } (resp.
Ac(p) = {u10i }).
Otherwise, by construction, we have that Ac(p) = ∅.
Correctness of the construction. We show that G has a size-k independent set if and only
if P admits a stable matching.
For the “only if” part, assume that U ′ ⊆ U is a size-k independent set where U ′ = {uq1 , uq2 , . . . , uqk}
with qi−1 < qi for all i ∈ {2, 3, . . . , k}. One can verify that the following matching M is stable.
– For each uqj ∈ U
′ set M(a5j ) = u
1
qj
, M(b5j ) = u
10
qj
, M(a1j) = a
2
j , M(a
3
j ) = a
4
j , M(b
1
j) = b
2
j , and
M(b3j ) = b
4
j . Note that this in particular defines matchings for all selector agents.
– For each ui ∈ U
′ and for each c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, set M(u2c+1i ) = u
2c
i .
– For each ui /∈ U
′ and for each c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} set M(u2c−1i ) = u
2c
i .
Before we go on with the “if” part, we observe some properties that each stable matching of
our constructed profile must satisfy.
Claim 1. Every stable matching M for our constructed profile satisfies the following two prop-
erties.
(1) For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k} the selector agent b5j is matched with some vertex agent of the
form u10i for some i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
(2) No two vertex agents u10i and u
10
i′ which are both matched to some selector agents correspond
to two adjacent vertices.
Proof of Claim 1. LetM be a stable matching for our profile. For the first statement, Lemma 4.2(1)
immediately implies that for every selector agent b5j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, it holds that M(a
5
j ) ∈ {u
10
i |
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1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
For the second statement, suppose, towards a contradiction, that there are two vertex
agents u10i , u
10
i′ (for some distinct i, i
′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) which are matched to some selector
agents such that the corresponding vertices ui and ui′ are adjacent, i.e., {ui, ui′} ∈ Ec for
some c ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. This means that {M(u10i ),M(u
10
i′ )} ⊆ {b
5
j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}. Consequently, by
Lemma 4.3(1), it follows that M(u2ci ) = u
2c+1
i and M(u
2c
i′ ) = u
2c+1
i′ . However, by construction,
both u2ci and u
2c
i′ prefer each other to their respective partner, forming a blocking pair for M—a
contradiction. (of Claim 1) ⋄
To show the “if” part, let M be a stable matching. Then, Claim 1 immediately implies that the
subset U ′ = {ui |M(u
10
i ) = b
5
j for some j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}} is an independent set of size k.
5 Conclusion
We investigated Stable Roommates for preferences with popular structural properties, such as
being narcissistic, single-peaked, and single-crossing. We showed the existence of stable match-
ings and managed to speed up the detection of such matchings when the preferences are com-
plete, narcissistic, and single-peaked (or single-crossing). One speed-up result (Proposition 3.4)
even leads to a sub-linear-time algorithm. For incomplete preferences with ties, however, nar-
cissistic and single-peakedness even combined with single-crossingness do not help to lower the
computational complexity—Stable Roommates remains NP-complete.
We conclude with some challenges for future research. First, to better understand the NP-
completeness result, one can study the parameterized complexity with respect to the “degree”
of incompleteness of the input preferences, such as the number of ties or the number of agents
that are in the same equivalence class of the tie-relation. We refer to some recent papers on the
parameterized complexity of preference-based stable matching problems [1, 10–12, 25, 35–37, 40]
for this line of research.
Second, we were not able to settle the computational complexity for complete preferences
that are also single-peaked and single-crossing.
Third, for incomplete preferences, we extended the concepts of single-peaked and single-
crossing preferences. There are, however, further relevant extensions in the literature [16, 21, 32],
which deserve attention in the study of stable matching problems. Do our results transfer to
preferences with these extensions?
Finally, the algorithm of Bartholdi III and Trick [4] strongly relies on the following condition.
At each step, there are always two agents that consider each other most acceptable.
To explore the boundary between tractable and intractable cases it is important to know which
other structural properties satisfy this condition. For instance, the so-called worst-restricted
property (i.e., no three agents exist such that each of them is least preferred by some agent)
is a generalization of the single-peaked property. In fact, we can show that for preferences
without ties, the narcissistic and worst-restricted properties are enough to guarantee that there
are always two agents which consider each other most acceptable [19]. For profiles with ties,
however, it seems unclear how to define a worst-restricted property so that the question of “how
far one can generalize structured preferences so that the above condition still holds” remains
open.
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